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Abstract
The standards landscape for IoT security is currently devel-
oping in a fragmented manner. This paper provides a re-
view of the main IoT security standards and guidelines that
have been developed by formal standardisation organisations
and transnational industry associations and interest alliances to
date. The review makes three main contributions to the study
of current IoT standards-development processes. First, gov-
ernments and regulatory agencies in the EU and the US are
increasingly considering the promotion of baseline IoT secu-
rity requirements, achieved through public procurement obli-
gations and cybersecurity certification schemes. Second, the
analysis reveals that the IoT security standards landscape is
dominated by de facto standards initiated by a diverse range of
industry associations across the IoT ecosystem. Third, the pa-
per identifies a number of key challenges for IoT security stan-
dardisation, most notably: a) the difficulty of setting a baseline
for IoT security across all IoT applications and domains; and
b) the difficulty of monitoring the adoption, implementation
and effectiveness of IoT security standards and best practices.
The paper consequently contributes to a better understanding
of the evolution of IoT security standards and proposes a more
coherent standards development and deployment approach.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is receiving increasing attention
from industry, policy makers, consumers and the media. A re-
cent report commissioned by OFCOM – the communications
regulator in the UK – estimated that the number of IoT connec-
tions in the UK will reach 155.7 million by the end of 2024, at
an expected compound average growth rate of approximately
36% [1]. This growth can be explained by a number of factors,
including the increased adoption of IoT consumer products, es-
pecially in the EU, the US and South-East Asia [2], as well as
by the “business transformation” that IoT promises in terms of
increased efficiency and revenue, risk management and costs
reduction [3].
However, increased device connectivity and process integra-
tion have exposed new vulnerabilities in IoT device security,
data integrity and system reliability. In 2016, compromised
IoT devices located all over the world were used to produce
the most powerful DDoS attack ever recorded against a DSN,
at 1-TBps. This led security analysts at Cisco to conclude that
security weaknesses in IoT devices and systems have brought
about new attack strategies, coined as “Destruction of Service”
(DeOS) [4]. IoT security is thus becoming central to busi-
nesses and the public sector. In 2017, Ovum found that “data
security and privacy concerns”, “legacy IT infrastructure and
systems” and “the lack of a robust business case” were reported
as the top three barriers to the deployment of IoT [5].
IoT security standards, especially common and open standards,
play a crucial role in lowering these barriers to acceptability,
adoption and deployment of the IoT [6–8]. A recent survey
conducted by the PETRAS IoT Research Hub, BSI and IoTUK
showed (Figure 1) that public and private organisations use
IoT cybersecurity standards for several reasons, most notably
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Fig. 1: Reasons for Using Standards Related to Cybersecurity
of the IoT. Data shows responses to Question 9 of the
‘Cybersecurity of the Internet of Things Standards Sur-
vey’ [9]: “Please tell us what goal the standards you
identified support. Select all that apply.
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to achieve interoperability (22.9%), for regulatory compliance
(18.3%), for certification purposes (14.5%) and for compliance
with public tendering (14.5%) [9].
Policy makers, regulatory agencies and the industry are also in-
creasingly agreeing that a baseline for IoT security is required
to ensure data protection, service continuity and public safety
[10–13]. Yet, given the diversity of IoT application areas and
domains, what this security baseline should include and how
it should be implemented and monitored, is still a matter for
debate.
1.1 Scope of the Paper
This paper provides a review of the main trends in the develop-
ment and evolution of IoT security standards to date. It aims to
offer a detailed analysis of the extent to which standardisation
efforts are leading towards the establishment of a baseline for
IoT security in some of the most developed IoT markets [2],
with particular focus on the UK, EU and US. Standards are
defined here broadly to include principles, guidelines, codes of
practice and technical specifications that are developed by pub-
lic, private and not-for-profit entities, including government
departments and agencies, national standardisation bodies, in-
dustry alliances and associations1.
Although the paper makes reference to some of the key IoT
security standards for specific domains, such as connected
autonomous vehicles, medical devices and industrial applica-
tions, it does not provide a comprehensive review of standards
for each IoT application area. Instead, it focuses on what in-
dustry and the public sector have currently identified as tech-
nical and organisational specifications for default IoT security.
1.2 Methodology
This paper summarises findings of an ongoing study conducted
by the Standards, Governance and Policy (SGP) team of the
PETRAS IoT Research Hub, which examines the dynamics
between voluntary standards and mandatory regulatory frame-
works for ensuring the adoption of a baseline of IoT security.
The research is underpinned by methodological triangulation
based upon:
1. Desk-based research of IoT security guidelines, codes of
practice and technical specifications, developed by public,
private and not-for-profit organisations;
2. An online ‘Cybersecurity of the Internet of Things Stan-
dards Survey’, exploring the use and implementation of
1 This broad definition is adopted because technical (or design) specifica-
tions represent only one type of standards, which generally address behaviour
at the prevention stage. As outlined in the specialist literature, standards can
also focus on “the act that gives rise to a harmful result” – known as perfor-
mance standards, such as risk assessment in the context of cybersecurity, or
they can focus on “the harmful result itself” – known as target standards, such
as joint incident responses conducted by CERTs. For a foundational descrip-
tion of standards typologies, see Baldwin et al [14].
IoT security standards, conducted by PETRAS IoT, BSI
and IoTUK (March 2017);
3. A workshop on ‘IoT Security by Default’ with PETRAS
IoT researchers and partners, exploring standards devel-
opment in IoT consumer goods, transport, health, and
utilities (March 2017).
A fourth stage, consisting of a series of semi-structured inter-
views with key standards development organisations, trade as-
sociations and UK regulatory bodies, is currently being con-
ducted in order to gather more evidence on the barriers to the
adoption and implementation of IoT security standards.
1.3 Key Findings
This paper puts forward the following findings, as discussed in
the sections below:
1. While the policy and regulatory status quo is still based
on a ‘light touch’ approach to standardising IoT security,
governments and regulatory agencies in the EU and the
US are increasingly considering the promotion of base-
line IoT security requirements, achieved through public
procurement obligations and cybersecurity certification
schemes.
2. This policy shift can be seen as a response to the slow
pace of IoT security self-regulation achieved by the mar-
ket. Specifically, the IoT security standards landscape
is dominated by de facto standards, developed by a di-
verse range of industry alliances and associations across
the IoT ecosystem. Although there is some degree of con-
vergence towards baseline specifications for IoT security
across these schemes, there is also considerable competi-
tion between them, evident in the parallel development of
industry-led testing and certification schemes.
3. Two main gaps in the development of a commonly agreed
baseline for IoT security can be identified. First, there
is clear divergence across the reviewed standards on
the basic scope and relationship between IoT security,
safety, consumer trust, trustworthiness and system in-
tegrity. Second, at present, there is limited information
about the adoption, implementation and review rate of
government and industry-led standards for IoT security,
which makes their effectiveness difficult to monitor and
evaluate.
2 Policies, Regulatory Frameworks and
High-Level Guidelines for IoT Security
The policy landscape for IoT security is currently mixed, espe-
cially across the three regions that are estimated to “represent
67% of the overall IoT installed base in 2017” – Western Eu-
rope, North America and East Asia [2]. Over the past years,
governments and regulatory agencies across these regions have
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promoted a ‘light touch’ approach to securing the IoT, issu-
ing a combination of non-binding high level guidelines and
sector-specific recommendations. In other words, governments
have predominantly utilised their advisory and steering pow-
ers, rather than their rule-making capacity to promote IoT se-
curity.
In the UK, this approach was detailed in the ‘Cyber Secu-
rity Regulation and Incentives Review’ conducted by HMG
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS),
which stated that “for now, [the UK] Government will not seek
to pursue further general cyber security regulation for the wider
economy over and above the GDPR” [15]. Simultaneously, the
UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has developed a
set of eight principles for ‘secure by default’ devices and sys-
tems, including security by design, transparency and usability
[16].
This steering approach adopted by the UK Government does
not mean that IoT data integrity and security are fully un-
regulated [17–19]. At present, several regulatory frameworks
apply to aspects of IoT data integrity and security, such as
the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR
2016/679) and the Network and Information Systems Directive
(NIS 2016/1148). These require data protection impact assess-
ments or cybersecurity risk assessments for organisations that
use new technologies or provide essential services that result
in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals or the
integrity of critical infrastructure. In addition, security guide-
lines for specific IoT applications have been put forward by
other UK Government departments, such as the ‘Key Princi-
ples of Cyber Security for Connected and Automated Vehicles’
developed by HMG Department for Transport [20].
A similar policy landscape has taken shape in the US. In
2016, the US Department of Homeland Security produced a
set of non-binding ‘Strategic Principles for Securing the IoT’,
proposing an integrated, end-to-end approach to securing the
IoT based on security by design as well as continuous product,
system and business lifecycle risk assessment [21]. In addition,
specialised agencies in the US have also promoted non-binding
cybersecurity guidelines and recommendations for automated
vehicles [22] and for medical devices [23], [24].
2.1 Mandating IoT Security?
Recently, the policy landscape for IoT security has under-
gone important changes that raise questions about the extent
to which a baseline for IoT security could be driven by new
legislative and regulatory initiatives. Two major developments
are pointing in this direction: a) two legislative proposals in the
US and the EU; and b) the increasing role of formal standardi-
sation, communications and cybersecurity agencies in promot-
ing detailed guidelines that apply to IoT security.
In August 2017, a bill entitled the ‘IoT Cybersecurity Im-
provement Act’ was introduced in the US Senate, propos-
ing “minimal cybersecurity operational standards for Internet-
connected devices purchased by Federal agencies, and for
other purposes” [25]. Currently in referral to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the proposed
bill requires written proof of third-party security certification
in public acquisition contracts and procurement of Internet-
connected devices (Sec 3.1 A(i)).
In September 2017, the European Commission proposed a
regulation that would formally establish the European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) as the
‘Cybersecurity Agency’ of the EU. ENISA is tasked with sev-
eral cybersecurity coordination and operational functions, in-
cluding the preparation of an initially voluntary cybersecurity
certification scheme based on three assurance levels (‘basic’,
‘substantial’, ‘high’) [26].
The proposed legislations make reference to key security prin-
ciples and technical specifications which have been put for-
ward by formal standardisation, communication and cyberse-
curity agencies in the US and the EU. These guidelines are in-
creasingly converging towards a set of minimum specifications
for IoT security at the device and at the system level (Figure 2).
At device level, minimum security requirements such as vul-
nerability disclosure, upgradability and service lifecycle man-
agement are proposed by a number of public agencies in the
US, including the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration (NTIA) [27] and the Federal Trade Com-
mission (FTC) [28]. At the system level, authentication, au-
thorisation, access controls, cryptographic key management as
well as integrity management are proposed by the US National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [29] and ENISA
[30]. In addition, these agencies have set up several multistake-
holder engagement processes for the continuous development
and review of baseline requirements for security in IoT devices
and critical infrastructure domains [11], [31–33].
Overall, the policy landscape in the UK, EU and US reveals in-
creased convergence towards a baseline for IoT security. How-
ever, given that the proposed guidelines are supported by non-
Fig. 2: Converging Principles for IoT Security in Legislations
and High-Level Guidelines (EU, US)
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binding frameworks and recommendations, it can be easily ar-
gued that a ‘light touch’ approach to IoT security continues to
be the predominant policy option, at least at present.
While differences between the certification schemes in the US
and the EU remain – with the US bill proposing a more flex-
ible, contract-by-contract ‘written certification’ requirement
(Sec 3.1 (i)), and the EU regulation proposing a more cen-
tralised scheme developed by ENISA (Art 44) – these devel-
opments could pave the way towards the emergence of an in-
ternational baseline for IoT security [13].
3 Industry Codes of Practice, Technical
Specifications and Certification Schemes
The recent policy shift towards the establishment of a baseline
for IoT security via new legislation and certification can be,
at least in part, explained by the fragmented and increasingly
competitive landscape for IoT security standardisation.
The PETRAS IoT ‘Cybersecurity of the Internet of Things
Standards Survey’ confirmed the fragmented standards land-
scape for IoT security [9]. When asked about their awareness
of both formal and de facto standards2 that apply to IoT cy-
bersecurity, respondents showed limited convergence towards
2 Formal standards, also known as de jure standards, are those developed
and/or endorsed by formal standardisation organisations at domestic (e.g.
BSI), regional (e.g. CEN/CENELEC) or international level (e.g. ISO). They
are formal because they go through formalised adoption, review and audit pro-
cesses. De facto standards, also known as market-driven standards, are devel-
oped either by single entities (e.g. companies) or by expert interest associa-
tions (e.g. GSMA, IoT Security Foundation). They are de facto because they
become the predominant standard through market adoption.
a predominant standard (Figure 3). However, the ISO/IEC
27000 series of information security management standards
emerged as most popular.
With regard to their awareness of de facto standards, the re-
spondents identified the GSM Association (GSMA) IoT Secu-
rity Guidelines [34–37] and the Open Web Application Secu-
rity Project (OWASP) IoT Security Guidance [38–39] as the
most well-known standards related to IoT security.
The distribution of responses in Figure 3 underlines pressing
issues about IoT security standardisation. First, although rele-
vant for IoT security, the ISO/IEC 27000 series of information
security management standards does not apply to all compo-
nents of the IoT ecosystem. There is, thus, a clear gap in the
development of formal security standards specific to the IoT
which take into account both device and end-to-end security.
Second, formal standards development organisations (SDOs)
have to clearly highlight the extent to which their activities
cover all aspects of IoT security and the extent to which es-
tablished standards, such as the ISO/IEC 27000 series, apply
to the IoT.
3.1 Formal Standards Relevant to IoT Security
At present, the development of formal standards pertaining to
IoT security is relatively slow moving. There are at least two
reasons that explain this pace of development. First, formal
standardisation processes are generally longer than market-
driven ones, due to the highly institutionalised approval and re-
view process. In addition, formal standards development in re-
gional and international organisations is more politicised, due
to the complex voting structure (e.g. national weighted voting
in ETSI) or the competitive promotion of national standards
for international adoption (e.g. ISO or ITU).
Second, the topology of the IoT ecosystem (i.e. edge, con-
nectivity, services) as well as its large application area (e.g.
consumer goods, critical infrastructure and essential services)
challenge the current organisation of formal standards devel-
opment activities. This can be observed through the develop-
ment of formal standards in the International Organisation for
Standardisation (ISO) [40–43] and the national and regional
standardisation organisations [44] that have partnered to create
oneM2M [45] (Figure 4).
In addition, the formal standards landscape is complicated by
standardisation activities pertaining to specific IoT application
areas, such as the development of security standards for smart
grid systems in CEN/CENELEC (EU) [46] or NIST (US) [47].
Thus, although formal standardisation processes relevant to
IoT security are advancing, it is difficult to say that a base-
line for IoT security has so far been achieved in formal SDOs.
As seen in the case of ISO (Figure 4), the IoT challenges the
organisation of formal standardisation activity, and requires
coordination and a more careful alignment between technical
committees working on IoT architecture and interoperability,
4
Fig. 4: Formal Published Standards Relevant to IoT Security
security, risk management, supply chain management and con-
sumer product safety.
3.2 De Facto Standards Relevant to IoT Security
Several industry alliances and interest associations have re-
sponded to the gaps in formal standards development by
proposing their own guidelines for securing the IoT. Increas-
ingly, these guidelines are complemented by compliance test-
ing procedures for members or interested parties. Some in-
dustry associations are also promoting their own certification
labels and trust marks, as a way of showcasing compliance
with the proposed guidelines. In addition, open certification
marks are currently developed by not-for-profit organisations
targeting consumers and start-up companies [48].
Table 1 provides a summary of the main industry and inter-
est associations that have to this date developed IoT security-
related guidelines [34–39], [49–56], compliance testing pro-
Table 1: Market-Driven Guidelines, Testing and Certification
Frameworks for IoT Security
cedures and certification marks [57–67] to signal their confor-
mity with a responsible level of IoT security.
Table 1 shows that the IoT security standards and best prac-
tice landscape has been predominantly shaped by the mar-
ket via transnational industry alliances and interest associa-
tions. A quick review of the guidelines, testing and certifica-
tion schemes proposed by these associations reveals three main
findings.
First, there is growing convergence in de facto standardisation
towards a set of core technical and organisational specifica-
tions to ensure a responsible level of IoT security. This con-
vergence has also been noted by cybersecurity agencies and
standardisation bodies in the EU and the US [30, 32, 68], and
includes:
Core Technical Specifications
• Identification, authentication, authorization
• Cryptography
• Security auditing
• Self-protection and component isolation
• Data integrity and minimisation
Core Organisational Specifications
• Risk and asset management
• Threat analysis and use case assessments
• Lifecycle and end-of-life support
• User awareness through clear policies and labelling
Second, the development of de facto guidelines and certifi-
cation schemes increases the complexity of the current stan-
dards landscape for IoT security, especially for new entrants
and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) who have to
navigate through the complex landscape of standards, guide-
lines and best practices currently available.
Participants of the ‘Secure by Default’ Workshop organised by
PETRAS IoT (March 2017) echoed this, emphasising that the
decision to select the most appropriate standards for their par-
ticular business is one of the main challenges faced by entities
in the IoT ecosystem, especially at the manufacturing and ser-
vice level.
In addition, the PETRAS IoT ‘Cybersecurity of the Internet
of Things Standards Survey’ revealed an already mixed pic-
ture when it comes to the ease of implementing and deploying
current standards for IoT security (Figure 5). This reality can
explain, at least in part, why legislators and public agencies are
increasingly preoccupied with setting a level playing field for
IoT security.
Lastly, current IoT security best practices expose new interde-
pendencies that challenge and will continue to challenge stan-
dardisation processes in the future. The list of market-driven
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guidelines in Table 1 uncovers new tensions in setting a unique
baseline for IoT security across its multiple application areas
and domains, most importantly the relationships between: a)
cyber security, physical security and safety, and b) trust as
consumer protection, service reliability and system resilience.
For instance, a majority of the reviewed guidelines identify
consumer trust as a fundamental aspect of IoT security gov-
ernance. However, the proposed principles and practices that
correspond to ensuring consumer trust vary considerably, rang-
ing from lifecycle security controls and patching, to privacy
and vulnerability disclosure policies, to safety impact assess-
ments.
4 Conclusions
The current paper reviewed the main IoT security standards
and guidelines that have been established by formal regional
and international standardisation organisations, as well as by
transnational industry associations and alliances to date. Draw-
ing on desk-based research as well as survey and workshop
data, the review uncovers the fragmented nature of the IoT
standardisation landscape and some of the main challenges to
IoT security standards development.
First, the analysis of both a) Policies, Regulatory Frameworks
and High-Level Guidelines for IoT Security and b) Industry
Codes of Practice, Technical Specifications and Certification
Schemes showed the extent to which standardisation efforts are
leading towards the establishment of a baseline for IoT security
in some of the most developed IoT markets, with particular
focus on the UK, EU and US.
Second, the paper highlighted that the IoT security standards
landscape is dominated by de facto standards initiated by a
diverse range of industry associations across the IoT ecosys-
tem. The development of de facto guidelines and certifica-
tions schemes increases the complexity of the current standards
landscape and reinforces fragmentation as well as the difficulty
for new entrants and SMEs to identify the most suitable stan-
dards and guidelines currently available.
Third, the paper identified a number of key challenges for the
current IoT security standards landscape, most notably: a) the
difficulty of setting a baseline for IoT security across all IoT
applications and domains, which adds complexity to defin-
ing specifications that clarify the relationship between data in-
tegrity — cyber and physical security — safety — resilience
— trustworthiness; as well as b) the difficulties of monitoring
the adoption and implementation of IoT security standards and
best practices by market entities involved in the development,
manufacturing and service provision of IoT.
The analysis of the evolution and current state of deployment
of IoT security standards contributes to a better understanding
of the need for a more aligned standardisation approach. Stan-
dards development organisations are encouraged to seek more
extensive coordination across technical committee and have to
a) fill the gap of developing formal security standards which
take into account both device and end-to-end security, and are
specific to the IoT; and b) articulate more clearly the extent to
which their activities cover all aspects of IoT security and the
extent to which their published standards, such as information
security standards, apply to the IoT.
Additionally, the review affirmed that more research on the
barriers to adoption and implementation of IoT security stan-
dards is needed. This will be pursued by the PETRAS IoT
Research Hub in the course of a further analysis stage which
involves semi-structured interviews with key standards devel-
opment organisations, trade associations and UK regulatory
bodies. This holistic assessment can feed into ongoing policy
reviews and standardisation processes, by revealing the main
opportunities and challenges to achieving a secure IoT.
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